Date when decision was rendered: 13.12.1993

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 4489; S92/1250

Reference to source

KKO 1993:156.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 1993 II July-December

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 1993 II juli-december

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 1993 II heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Court

Date of publication: 1994

Pages: pp. 699-703

Subject

compensation, lawful detention, deprivation of liberty,
skadestånd, laglig anhållande, frihetsberövande,
vahingonkorvaus, laillinen pidätys, vapaudenriisto,

Relevant legal provisions

Sections 1 and 2 of the Act on Compensation from State Funds for the Arrest or Detention of an Innocent Person

= lag om ersättning av statens medel som till följd av frihetsberövande skall betalas till oskyldigt häktad eller dömd 1 § och 2 §

= laki syyttömästi vangitulle tai tuomitulle valtion varoista vapauden menetyksen johdosta maksettavasta korvauksesta 1 § ja 2 §.

ECHR-5-1-c, CCPR 14-3-g

Abstract

The court of first instance and the court of appeal had dismissed an application for compensation, based on the Act on Compensation from State Funds for the Arrest or Detention of an Innocent Person.Both instances referred to the fact that the defendant had changed his story during the investigation and the trial and thereby contributed to his detention.The court of appeal referred to Article 5-1-c of the ECHR authorising detention on reasonable suspicion of a n offence.In quashing the ruling by the court of appeal and granting compensation, the Supreme Court referred to Article 14-3-g of the CCPR, according to which a defendant shall not be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.

26.3.1998 / 11.4.2007 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 14.6.1996

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 2225; S-95/868

Reference to source

KKO 1996:75.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 1996 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 1996 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 1996 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Court

Date of publication: 1996

Pages: pp. 357-361

Subject

deprivation of liberty, compensation,
frihetsberövande, skadestånd,
vapaudenriisto, vahingonkorvaus,

Relevant legal provisions

Section 4 of the Act on Compensation from State Funds for the Arrest or Detention of an Innocent Person

= lag om ersättning av statens medel som till följd av frihetsberövande skall betalas till oskyldigt häktad eller dömd 4 §

= laki syyttömästi vangitulle tai tuomitulle valtion varoista vapauden menetyksen johdosta maksettavasta korvauksesta 4 §.

ECHR-5-5, CCPR-9-5

Abstract

A policeman had ordered A to be taken into custody and demanded the court of first instance to order that A lose his parole because of his misbehaviour.The court of first instance rejected the demand.The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that A had the right to receive compensation for the unnecessary deprivation of his liberty.

Considering the purpose of section 4 of the Act on Compensation from State Funds for the Arrest or Detention of an Innocent Person, which is to guarantee compensation to innocent persons who have been deprived of their liberty because of crime investigation or conviction, the compensation provisions in question have, in established case law, been interpreted widely and applied with analogy.Therefore the Supreme Court quashed the decision of the court of first instance and the judgment of the court of appeal and held that A was entitled to compensation for the deprivation of his liberty.

In addition to section 4 of the Act on Compensation from State Funds.A's claims for compensation were based on Article 9-5 of the CCPR and Article 5-5 of the ECHR.

30.3.1998 / 11.4.2007 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 22.8.1991

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No.2744; 520/7/91

Reference to source

KHO 1991-A-47.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 1991 A, General Part

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 1991 A, allmän del

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 1991 A, yleinen osa

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Administrative Court

Date of publication: 1992

Pages: pp. 160-161

Subject

deprivation of liberty, aliens, compensation,
frihetsberövande, utlänningar, skadestånd,
vapaudenriisto, ulkomaalaiset, vahingonkorvaus,

Relevant legal provisions

Aliens Act; section 2-1-3 of the Act on County Administrative Courts; section 3-1 of the Administrative Appeals Act

= utlänningslag; lag om länsrätter 2 § 1 mom. 3 punkten; lag om ändringssökande i förvaltningsärenden 3 § 1 mom.

= ulkomaalaislaki; lääninoikeuslaki 2 § 1 mom. 3 kohta; laki muutoksenhausta hallintoasioissa 3 § 1 mom.

CCPR-2

Abstract

On 2 April 1990, the Human Rights Committee had found a violation by Finland of Article 2 of the CCPR in the Torres case (Communication No.291/1988).Mr.Torres had not been able to have the legality of his deprivation of liberty determined by a court without delay.The Human Rights Committee stated that Finland therefore should compensate Mr.Torres for the violation of his rights.In his application to the Ministry of the Interior, Mr.Torres requested that Finland pay him the sum of FIM 50.000 plus an annual 16 % interest rate since 10.1.1988.

In its decision, the Ministry of the Interior stated that Mr.Torres had not been able to have the legality of the deprivation of his liberty determined by a court on the basis of the provisions of the Aliens' Act in force at the time of the deprivation of his liberty.Therefore the Ministry of the Interior, while rejecting most of the demands and taking into account Article 2 of the CCPR, decided to award Mr.Torres the sum of FIM 7000 as compensation.The Ministry noted that the relevant provisions of the Aliens' Act had subsequently been amended by Act 408/1990.

In the Supreme Administrative Court, Mr.Torres demanded the payment of the full sum requested by him in his application to the Ministry of the Interior.The Supreme Administrative Court stated that the Ministry's decision was not a binding decision on Mr.Torres' right to compensation as regards the part of the application for compensation rejected by the Ministry.The Ministry's decision was not such a decision which according to section 3-1 of the Administrative Appeals Act could be appealed.The decision of the Ministry could be brought to the county administrative court as an administrative dispute.For this reason, the Supreme Adminstrative Court transferred the case to the county administrative court.

1.4.1998 / 11.4.2007 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 5.5.1999

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 1128; M 97/100

Reference to source

KKO 1999:52.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 1999 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 1999 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 1999 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Court

Date of publication: 1999

Pages: pp. 371-375

Subject

right to property, compensation,
äganderätt, skadestånd,
omistusoikeus, vahingonkorvaus,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 71, 72 and 74 of the Building Act

= byggnadslagen 71 §, 72 §, 74 §

= rakennuslaki 71 §, 72 §, 74 §.

ECHRP-1-1

Abstract

After the approval of a town plan, an owner of a land estate had to give up part of his lands to the municipality for the construction of a road.The land was given up partly without compensation, partly against full compensation.According to section 71 of the Building Act, no compensation is paid for a private road or an area which the land owner has reserved to be used as a road, in cases when such a land area is later defined as a road area in a town plan.In other cases, full compensation has to be paid if the land owner so requests (section 72).If giving up the land area to the municipality without compensation causes the land owner harm which considering the circumstances may be regarded as unreasonable, the harm must be compensated (section 74).

In this case, the land owner appealed to the Land Court of Southern Finland and demanded additional compensation for the harm caused to the normal use of his residential house.According to the land court, the road was constructed so close to the house, that the normal use of the house was disturbed.In addition, the land area previously used as a garden had been lost.This caused unreasonable harm to the land owner and he was thus entitled to compensation as provided for in section 74 of the Building Act.When considering whether the harm was unreasonable, the land court noted that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR had to be taken into account, among other things, for the reason that Protocol No. 1 had been incorporated into Finnish law in 1990, after the Building Act was enacted (1958).

The municipality appealed to the Supreme Court which stated that the harm caused was not unreasonable.The total area of the land estate was fairly large and the house could be used as a residential building as before.The decision of the land court was quashed as far as it concerned the right to additional compensation for harm caused for the use of the residential house.

14.4.1998 / 3.8.2004 / JKOSKIMI

Date when decision was rendered: 9.10.2000

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 2229; S97/1935

Reference to source

KKO 2000:97.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2000 II July-December

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2000 II juli-december

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2000 II heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Court

Date of publication: 2001

Pages: pp. 500-516

Subject

non-discrimination, principle of proportionality, compensation, general principles of law,
icke-diskriminering, proportionalitetsprincipen, skadestånd, allmänna rättsprinciper,
syrjintäkielto, suhteellisuusperiaate, vahingonkorvaus, yleiset oikeusperiaatteet,

Relevant legal provisions

Damage Compensation Act; Act on the special protection of the river Kyröjoki (1139/1991)

= skadeståndslagen; lag om specialskydd för Kyro älv (1139/1991)

= vahingonkorvauslaki; Kyröjoen erityissuojelulaki (1139/1991)

Abstract

A contract between a company and the Government had not been fully implemented and had become void because of a new Act pertaining to the subject of the contract.On the basis of the Act, the company had already received some compensation.However, the company also accused the Government of breach of contract and demanded additional compensation.In support of its claim, the company referred not only to relevant national legislation but also to some general principles of law, among them the principles of proportionality and of non-discrimination as they result from the ECHR.It considered the said principles as restrictions to the discretion of the governmental authorities.

The court of first instance concluded that it had not been shown that the Government had committed a breach of contract or an act of negligence when enacting the new legislation.The principles of law, which the company referred to, could not alone and separately be applied as grounds for damages.The case went further to the court of appeal and to the Supreme Court, but the decisions of the two courts do not refer to the ECHR nor to general principles of law resulting from the ECHR.

28.10.2002 / 10.3.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 7.1.1998

Judicial body: Helsinki Court of Appeal = Helsingfors hovrätt = Helsingin hovioikeus

Reference: Report No. 9; S97/153

Reference to source

Registry of the Helsinki Court of Appeal

Helsingfors hovrätts registratorskontor

Helsingin hovioikeuden kirjaamo

Date of publication:

Subject

deprivation of liberty, compensation,
frihetsberövande, skadestånd,
vapaudenriisto, vahingonkorvaus,

Relevant legal provisions

section 4 of the Act on Compensation from State Funds for the Arrest or Detention of an Innocent Person

= lag om ersättning av statens medel som till följd av frihetsberövande skall betalas till oskyldigt häktad eller dömd 4 §

= laki syyttömästi vangitulle tai tuomitulle valtion varoista vapauden menetyksen johdosta maksettavasta korvauksesta 4 §

Abstract

The court of first instance had ordered compensation from state funds for A who had been arrested for 33 days but was declared innocent and released.A appealed against the decision and requested that the amount of compensation would be increased.

The court of appeal discussed, among other things, the question as to whether the behavior of a person during detention should be taken into account when considering the amount of compensation.During his detention, A had been passive and had often failed to answer the questions posed by the police.He had not specifically defended himself against the charges, although he had been given the possibility to do so and had also had a legal counsel.The court of appeal noted that the Constitution Act or human rights conventions do not guarantee a person who is suspected on reasonable grounds for an offence a short detention period or the least possible suffering.Instead, they guarantee the right to speak or to remain silent in one's own case and they provide protection against arbitrary treatment.The court continued that if a detained person for some reason does not wish to make use of the means guaranteed for his or her defence and of the possibility to thus clarify the matter, that person's claim for receiving an amount of compensation which is larger than on the average on account of a prolonged detention period is not likely to be successful.The court also referred to the principle of equality and noted that when assessing the amount of compensation no distinction should be made between persons, unless there is a justified cause for that.The court of appeal did not change the decision of the first instance court.The Supreme Court did not grant A leave to appeal.

6.8.2003 / 11.4.2007 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 25.3.2004

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 1663; M2000/36

Reference to source

KKO 2004:26.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2004 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2004 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2004 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2004

Pages: pp. 161-172

Subject

right to property, compensation,
äganderätt, skadestånd,
omistusoikeus, vahingonkorvaus,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 9 and 11 of the Act on the Protection of Buildings; sections 15 and 106 of the Constitution Act

= byggnadsskyddslag 9 § och 11 §; grundlagen 15 § och 106 §

= rakennussuojelulaki 9 § ja 11 §; perustuslaki 15 § ja 106 §

Abstract

On the basis of the Act on the Protection of Buildings, environment authorities had decided on a temporary prohibition concerning alterations to certain business premises owned by a housing corporation.While the decision on a possible protection of the premises was pending, the corporation was not to take any measures which would endanger the historical value of the interior of the premises as a pharmacy.The proposal for protection was later rejected.The housing corporation demanded compensation from the state on the grounds that the temporary prohibition had prevented the corporation from letting out the premises and had thus resulted in a loss of income.Rents from the business premises had been the housing corporation's main source of income.The lower appeal instances had rejected the claim as being without a foundation in law.Section 11 of the Act on the Protection of Buildings contains grounds for compensation after a decision on protection has been made but does not say anything about compensation for damage caused by a temporary prohibition.The Supreme Court discussed section 11 against the background of the protection of property in section 15 of the Constitution Act and considered whether there was a possible conflict between the two provisions in this case.The Court referred to the preparatory materials of the Act on the Protection of Buildings.Regarding the lack of provisions on compensation for damage caused by a temporary prohibition, the Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament had pointed out that there is no conflict with the constitutional protection of property provided that certain conditions are fulfilled.First, the temporary prohibition should only mean a duty not to demolish the building or to make alterations which would jeopardize its historical value.Secondly, the prohibition should not prevent the normal use of the building, its use in a manner from which the owner of the building gains reasonable benefit, or its use for another purpose than previously.The Constitutional Law Committee also regarded it necessary that in cases in which a temporary protection is not followed by a decision on protection and the task of maintaining the building exceeds the duties prescribed in law, those upon whom the prohibition has been imposed should have a right to compensation for damage which in their circumstances is unreasonable.The Supreme Court noted that the clear and carefully considered wording of section 11 did not allow an expansive interpretation of the provision so as to cover compensation for damage caused by a temporary prohibition.When the Act was drafted it had been presupposed that a temporary prohibition would not result in an interruption in a regular income from property as had in fact happened in this case.In the Supreme Court's view, being left without compensation in this case violates the protection of property as prescribed in section 15 of the Constitution Act.According to section 106 of the Constitution Act, if the application of an Act would be in evident conflict with the Constitution, the court shall give primacy to the provision in the Constitution.With reference to sections 15 and 106 of the Constitution Act, the Supreme Court ruled that the housing corporation had a right to compensation under section 11 of the Act on the Protection of Buildings.The matter was decided by a vote (7-4).Five justices based this outcome on an evident conflict between section 15 of the Constitution Act and the pertinent provision in the ordinary law.Two concurring justices suggested that the conflict between provisions could be avoided by using a method of interpretation which is favourable to human rights.By means of a "human rights-friendly" interpretation, section 11 could be considered to include a right to compensation for damage caused by a temporary prohibition in a case such as this.Altogether four dissenting justices were of the opinion that the housing corporation had no right to compensation.Two of them agreed that a "human rights-friendly" interpretation of section 11 was possible.However, in this case the difficulties in letting out the business premises were only partially due to the temporary prohibition and the inconvenience caused to the housing corporation was not unreasonable.On the same grounds, two justices concluded that the lack of right to compensation did not lead to an evident conflict between section 11 and the Constitution Act in this case.

20.1.2005 / 2.6.2006 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 25.5.2005

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report no. 1327; S2003/983

Reference to source

KKO 2005:66.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2005 I January-June

Avgörande av Högsta domstolen I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2005

Pages: pp. 477-481

Subject

compensation, fair trial, reasonable time,
skadestånd, rättvis rättegång, skälig tid,
vahingonkorvaus, oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, kohtuullinen aika,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 3, section 2 and Chapter 5, section 1 of the Tort Liability Act

= skadeståndslag 3 kapitel 2 § och 5 kapitel 1 §

= vahingonkorvauslaki 3 luku 2 § ja 5 luku 1 §.

ECHR-6-1

Abstract

A's driver's licence was temporarily suspended, because she was suspected of having been under the influence of narcotics when driving a car.The suspension took in fact close to four years, owing to the fact that the pretrial investigation in the matter was not completed within a reasonable time.A had had a temporary driver's licence only, valid for two years.She had completed the first part of her training in driving school and, in order to obtain a permanent driver's licence, she was to take a second training session before the temporary licence expired.Because of the suspension, she was not able to do so, and was eventually obliged to start her training from the beginning.A sued the state for damages demanding compensation for economic loss, including both the driving school costs and the inconvenience caused by the fact that she was not allowed to use her car for several years.

Under the Tort Liability Act, a public corporation is liable for damages caused through an error or negligence in the exercise of public authority, if the performance of the activity or task, in view of its nature and purpose, has not met the reasonable requirements set for it.In such cases, damages shall not only constitute compensation for personal injury or damage to property but also compensation for economic loss.In this case, it was undisputed that A was entitled to damages because of the excessive length of the pretrial investigation and of the suspension of her driver's licence.The question was rather what kind of economic loss should be covered.The court of first instance ruled that A was entitled to damages from the state for the costs caused by A having to retake her courses in driving school, but rejected A's other claims as being without a foundation in law.The court of appeal held that the length of the pretrial investigation and of the suspension of A's driver's licence were unreasonable and in violation of Article 6-1 of the ECHR.In view of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the state was therefore liable to pay damages also for the inconvenience caused by the suspension of the driver's licence.The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal, but based its decision on the Tort Liability Act only, without any reference to the ECHR.It held that obtaining a driver's licence requires an investment and losing the right to drive had in this case prevented A from making use of that investment.It had been difficult for A to move around and run her errands without her own car, and it may also have caused her difficulties in finding a job.The Supreme Court concluded that A was entitled to damages from the state also regarding the inconvenience caused by the suspension of her driver's licence.

26.5.2006 / 26.5.2006 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 8.12.2005

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report no. 3021; S2004/842

Reference to source

KKO 2005:128.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2005 II July-December

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2005 II juli-december

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2005 II heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2006

Pages: pp. 924-929

Subject

deprivation of liberty, compensation,
frihetsberövande, skadestånd,
vapaudenriisto, vahingonkorvaus,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 8, section 5-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act; sections 1 and 2 of the Act on Compensation from State Funds for the Arrest or Detention of an Innocent Person

= lag om rättegång i brottmål 8 kapitel 5 § 2 mom.; lag om ersättning av statens medel som till följd av frihetsberövande skall betalas till oskyldigt häktad eller dömd 1 § och 2 §

= laki oikeudenkäynnistä rikosasioissa 8 luku 5 § 2 mom.; laki syyttömästi vangitulle tai tuomitulle valtion varoista vapauden menetyksen johdosta maksettavasta korvauksesta 1 § ja 2 §.

ECHR-5-5; CCPR-9-5

Abstract

On the basis of the Criminal Procedure Act, the court of first instance had ordered that A, a defendant in a criminal matter, is to be fetched to the court hearing.On that occasion, A was deprived of his liberty for three days.The charges against A were later dismissed.The question was whether A was entitled to compensation for the deprivation of his liberty.The Supreme Court noted that while the Act on Compensation from State Funds for the Arrest or Detention of an Innocent Person explicitly refers to cases of arrest or detention on the basis of the Coercive Measures Act, in case law the provisions have been interpreted expansively to apply also in situations comparable to arrest or detention.The Supreme Court thus argued that the Act was applicable to deprivation of liberty based on an order to bring a person before a court in cases where the charges are dismissed.However, according to the Act a person is not entitled to compensation if he or she has tried to escape or avoid pretrial investigation or trial.In this case, A had been involved in several criminal matters and a warrant for his apprehension had been issued on 15 previous occasions.The court of first instance had therefore had weighty reasons to believe that A would fail to appear in court.In the Supreme Court's view, the order to fetch A to the hearing had thus been justified, and it can be held that A had himself contributed to the deprivation of his liberty.The Court concluded that A was not entitled to compensation, despite the fact that the charges against him had been dismissed.

Five concurring justices argued for a literal interpretation of the Act on Compensation from State Funds.The Act was not applicable in A's case and he was thus not entitled to compensation.The justices also referred to Article 5 of the ECHR and Article 9 of the CCPR and pointed out that a person is entitled to compensation on the basis of the human rights provisions, if the deprivation of that person's liberty has been illegal or based on legislation which is in violation of the ECHR or the CCPR.The order to fetch A to the hearing and the deprivation of his liberty were based on the law.The human rights provisions did not require an expansive interpretation of the Act on Compensation in this case.

29.5.2006 / 11.4.2007 / RHANSKI